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A GENERAL THEORY OF PREEMPTION: 
WITH COMMENTS ON STATE 
DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA 
LEA BRILMAYER* 
Abstract: Marijuana decriminalization is a hotly debated topic, which has none-
theless seen popular support in recent years. Current federal law (the Controlled 
Substances Act) conflicts with many state decriminalization efforts, raising the 
obvious question of federal preemption. The Supreme Court has failed to pro-
vide a clear answer on how much federal law preempts state marijuana decrimi-
nalization laws. This Article identifies the foundational principles of vertical and 
horizontal preemption, as well as various unanswered questions regarding these 
doctrines. It then applies these questions to marijuana decriminalization. Ulti-
mately, it argues that there is a weak case for vertical or horizontal preemption 
in the marijuana decriminalization context. 
INTRODUCTION 
Controversy about marijuana laws has moved from political circles into 
the courts. Nowadays many Americans treat marijuana as casually as their 
parents treated a martini. But not all; as with same sex marriage, the relaxed 
acceptance of certain members of our population has only made their socially 
conservative counterparts more determined to resist. 
When a small number of vanguard states jettisoned their criminal prohi-
bitions, the rallying cry of the challengers was “preemption.”1 To the uniniti-
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 1 According to Robert A. Mikos, courts have assumed that Congress intended to preempt all 
conflicts with the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), such that courts have interpreted state laws 
to be preempted by the CSA if they make compliance with federal law impossible or if they un-
dermine the fulfillment of Congress’ objectives. See Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the 
Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 10 (2013) (citing cases that em-
ployed broad conflicts preemption analysis). 
 The case authority includes: Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 
P.3d 518, 523–28 (Or. 2010) (concluding that to the extent the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act 
affirmatively authorized, rather than merely decriminalizing, the use of medical marijuana, it was 
preempted by the CSA); Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 651–54 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that an ordinance establishing a permit scheme for medical marijuana collectives stood as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the CSA and therefore was preempted by the CSA, as the 
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ated, the argument sounded pretty convincing. Marijuana was still illegal un-
der federal law; how could states make it legal? The Supremacy Clause 
makes federal law supreme and says that state officials are bound by it.2 End 
of story. 
But it’s becoming increasingly clear that this is not necessarily the direc-
tion things are headed.3 And now the Supreme Court must explain why. In the 
meantime, we can only speculate about the eventual outcome and what the 
high Court’s rationale will be. 
Revisiting the basic principles of horizontal and vertical federalism that 
the Court is likely to consider provides the perfect vehicle for developing a 
general theory of preemption. There are plenty of unanswered questions 
about the subject that would benefit from another look. For example, what are 
the important similarities and differences between the vertical (federal/state) 
and horizontal (state/state) versions of preemption? Although the concepts of 
vertical and horizontal federalism are about equally well accepted, the corre-
sponding two doctrines of preemption have differed widely in their usage. 
Why is that? And the debate over decriminalization of marijuana provides 
first-rate opportunities for examining the concrete applications of that general 
theory. What should all this theory mean for the practical questions about how 
much state law the federal marijuana laws displace? 
Part I of this Article provides background on the marijuana decriminali-
zation movement and federal preemption issues associated with the Con-
                                                                                                                           
ordinance not only decriminalized but also authorized the operation of these collectives), appeal 
docketed sub nom., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal. 
2012). 
 Pointing in the opposite direction are: Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 823 N.W.2d 864, 867–
73 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that Michigan’s medical marijuana law did not directly conflict 
with the CSA because the state medical marijuana law permitted but did not mandate use of mari-
juana, thereby making it possible to comply with both statutes simultaneously); Qualified Patients 
Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 102–10 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the decrim-
inalization provisions of the state’s medical marijuana laws were not preempted by the CSA); 
County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 475–83 (Ct. App. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2008) (holding that the provisions of the Medical Marijuana Program 
requiring California counties to provide identification cards to people exempt from certain mariju-
ana laws did not positively conflict with the CSA, as the CSA is silent on the ability of states to 
provide identification cards to their citizens, and the CSA does not compel states to impose crimi-
nal penalties for marijuana possession). 
 2 The Supremacy Clause states, “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwith-
standing.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 3 See infra notes 10–20 and accompanying text (describing the trend toward states’ decrimi-
nalization of marijuana). 
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trolled Substance Act (“CSA”).4 Part II discusses the vertical preemption doc-
trine and several unanswered questions in the doctrine as applied to a hypo-
thetical marijuana decriminalization scenario.5 Part III discusses the horizon-
tal preemption doctrine in comparison to the vertical preemption doctrine and 
applies it to the marijuana decriminalization scenario in order to reframe the 
debate.6 
I. SOME BACKGROUND 
Marijuana became a political, social, and medical concern in the general 
population starting roughly in the 1960’s.7 As recreational use of marijuana 
increased, Congress responded by passing the CSA.8 Marijuana was classi-
fied as a Schedule I substance, a drug with a high potential for abuse and de-
pendency and no recognized medical use or purpose.9 
Despite the wholesale federal ban on the possession, cultivation, and use 
of marijuana, state decriminalization has seen a steady rise.10 California be-
came the first state to legalize medical marijuana in 1996,11 and in 2012 Col-
orado became the first state to legalize its recreational use.12 In the aftermath 
of the November 2016 elections, twenty-eight states and the District of Co-
lumbia had resolved to permit marijuana usage for medical reasons,13 and 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See infra notes 7–36 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 37–75 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 76–91 and accompanying text. 
 7 Marijuana was, of course, available and used in the United States prior to the 1960s. It was 
in the 1960s, however, that its use spread to the largely white middle class. Busted: America’s 
War on Marijuana: Marijuana Timeline, PBS FRONTLINE (Apr. 1998), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html [https://perma.cc/5GKH-UJTB] (claiming that in the 
1960s, “A changing political and cultural climate was reflected in more lenient attitudes towards 
marijuana. Use of the drug became widespread in the white upper middle class.”). 
 8 Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012)).    
 9 21 U.S.C. § 812. 
 10 The rise began in the early 1970s. See ANGELA DILLS ET AL., CATO INSTITUTE, DOSE OF 
REALITY: THE EFFECT OF STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATIONS 3 (2016) (discussing the wave of 
decriminalization in eleven states between 1973 and 1978); see also Nate Silver, Gallup Poll Is First 
to Find Plurality Support for Marijuana Legalization, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), http://five
thirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/gallup-poll-is-first-to-find-plurality-support-for-marijuana-
legalization/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/C4VW-NA2P] (describing the rising public support for marijua-
na legalization). 
 11 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (1996). 
 12 See COLO. CONST., art. XVIII, § 16 (concerning personal use and regulation of marijuana); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-406 (2012) (concerning offenses relating to marijuana and marijuana 
concentrate); id. §§ 12-43.3-301 (2012) (concerning licensing requirements for marijuana estab-
lishments). 
 13 Rita Rubin, Many States Have Legalized Medical Marijuana, So Why Does DEA Still Say It 
Has No Therapeutic Use?, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ritarubin/2016/11/
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eight states allowed it for purely recreational use.14 As a result, more than half 
of all Americans can now access medical marijuana,15 and roughly twenty 
percent of the U.S. population lives in a state where recreational marijuana is 
legal.16 
These legal developments reflected a general change in attitudes. A dec-
ade ago, polls indicated that only 32% of those surveyed favored legalization; 
60% were opposed.17 As of September 2016, however, 57% of U.S. adults 
supported marijuana legalization, but only 37% said that it should remain il-
legal.18 According to a 2012 poll, over half of American adults (59%) felt that 
the question of legalization should be left to state governments.19 
It is significant that the decriminalization movement has achieved results 
mainly by working through state, not federal, political processes.20 The politi-
                                                                                                                           
16/many-states-have-legalized-medical-marijuana-so-why-does-dea-still-say-it-has-no-therapeutic-
use/#7bfcf80a7ec2. 
 14 Rob Hotakainen, Will Alabama’s Sessions Support States When the Issue Is Marijuana?, 
MCCLATCHY DC (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/article115643838.html [https://
perma.cc/566E-TLM8]. 
 15 James Higdon, Jeff Sessions’ Coming War on Legal Marijuana, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/jeff-sessions-coming-war-on-legal-marijuana-
214501 [https://perma.cc/LEF8-3UQQ]. 
 16 Tom Huddleston, Jr., These 6 States Voted to Legalize Marijuana, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/11/08/election-marijuana-legalization-states/ [https://perma.cc/EJR5-XAFD]. 
 17 Abigail Geiger, Support for Marijuana Legalization Continues to Rise, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 
12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/12/support-for-marijuana-legalization-
continues-to-rise/ [https://perma.cc/WCX9-RCEB]. 
 18 Id. The Pew Research Center survey, conducted from August 23 to September 2, 2016, 
shows that young adults have largely driven the increase in support for marijuana legalization and 
shows that partisan and ideological divides persist on the issue. Id. 
 19 See Fred Backus & Stephanie Condon, Poll: Nearly Half Support Legalization of Marijuana, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-nearly-half-support-legalization-of-
marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/R2PZ-XDCM]; see also Micah Cohen, Marijuana Legalization and 
States Rights, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 8, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
12/08/marijuana-legalization-and-states-rights/ [https://perma.cc/RQ2Q-DZPY] (discussing the 
tension between a subset of American adults who oppose marijuana legalization and yet support 
states’ rights). 
 20 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text (describing the rise of state decriminaliza-
tion of marijuana). This is not to say that no changes at all have taken place at the federal level. As 
states have pursued decriminalization efforts, the federal government, or at least the executive 
branch, has increasingly evinced a policy of non-interference. In August 2013, the Assistant At-
torney General James M. Cole issued a memorandum (the “Cole Memo”) to all U.S. attorneys, 
stating that the Department of Justice would not prioritize enforcement of federal marijuana laws 
in states that have enacted laws authorizing marijuana-related conduct if the states possess “strong 
and effective regulatory and enforcement systems” that address public health, safety, or law en-
forcement threats posed by state marijuana laws. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF DEPUTY AT-
TORNEY GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING 
MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 3 (2013). Therefore, to date, the Justice Department has not sued any 
state that has enacted decriminalization laws. The memorandum made clear, however, that the 
federal government has reserved the right to revise its stance on enforcement in the future. See id. 
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cally realistic could see that reform at the federal level was going nowhere.21 
Given the split in public opinion between the more conservative and more 
liberal regions of the country, a more practical approach to achieving wide-
spread change would be to establish footholds of reform and encourage per-
missive ideas to gradually spread.22 This “beachhead” model of reform had 
been employed by the pro-life movement with some success; reformers just 
had to be satisfied for the moment with only partial results.23 
The general appreciation of this method’s benefits has coincided with a 
resurgence of states’ rights rhetoric and growing resistance toward a per-
ceived aggrandizement of federal power.24 The mid-1990s elections, when 
the Republican Party gained control of Congress, heralded a time when party 
leaders sought to shift power from Washington to the states. The composition 
of the Supreme Court, with such figures as William Rehnquist, Sandra Day 
O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas, was also more amenable to the states’ 
rights movement. During this period, Supreme Court cases such as New York 
                                                                                                                           
With the changes in Washington currently underway, shifts to the right should be expected. See 
Higdon, supra note 15. 
 21 Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of 
State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 556 (2010) (arguing that the focus on debates over legaliza-
tion at the federal level is misplaced because of the lack of power of the federal government to 
unilaterally legalize any controlled substance); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: 
Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1426, 1434–35 (2009) [hereinafter Mikos, On the Limits] (arguing that the categorical feder-
al ban on marijuana appears to be here to stay and that state exemption may have more impact on 
private behavior than federal bans because of the lack of federal enforcement and influence over 
human behavior). 
 22 See Mikos, On the Limits, supra note 21, at 1424–26 (explaining why permissive state laws 
foster or enable changing federal behavior and social opinions toward marijuana); Geiger, supra 
note 17 (describing the partisan divide in public opinion on marijuana legalization). 
 23 Glen A. Halva-Neubauer & Sara L. Zeigler, Promoting Fetal Personhood: The Rhetorical 
and Legislative Strategies of the Pro-Life Movement After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 22 FEM-
INIST FORMATIONS 101, 102 (2010) (describing the rhetorical and legal strategies utilized by the 
pro-life movement to create public opposition to abortion after Planned Parenthood v. Casey); 
J.K. Hammack, Imagining a Brave New World: Towards a Nuanced Discourse of Fetal Person-
hood, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 357, 362–63 (2014) (describing the Court’s reasoning in Roe v. 
Wade, which opened the door for states to regulate pregnancy by recognizing the government’s 
interest in protecting the fetus). 
 24 See Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/17states.html [https://perma.cc/2T43-RXBQ] (re-
counting that Michael Boldin, the founder of the Tenth Amendment Center “thought states that 
had bucked federal authority over the last decade by legalizing medical marijuana . . . had set the 
template in some ways for the [states’ rights] effort now” by demonstrating the efficacy of nullifi-
cation, or the argument that states can invalidate or disregard any federal laws that they deem to be 
unconstitutional). 
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v. United States in 199225 and Printz v. United States in 1997,26 breathed new 
life into the Tenth Amendment.27 
But the central weakness of the beachhead model is the continued loom-
ing presence of a uniform federal standard and the entrenchment of that fed-
eral standard in the non-foothold states. Where the value in question is one 
that both sides agree should be decided at the federal level and then imposed 
uniformly onto the country as a whole, neither side is likely to be tolerant for 
long of such geographically defined compromise. As Thomas Jefferson wise-
ly prophesied when faced with the Missouri Compromise, “A geographical 
line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived 
and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every 
new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper.”28 A country divided by pro-
found social differences, one side clutching its deeply held values as the other 
tightens its siege and bides its time, is not exactly the happy federalism that 
the Founding Fathers had in mind. This is true whether the values in question 
are of the left or of the right. 
Fortunately, the stakes are not what they were in slavery days. But even 
as new state marijuana laws proliferate, significant questions remain regard-
ing whether, or to what extent, Section 903 of the CSA preempts state efforts 
at decriminalization. Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor any feder-
al appellate court, has faced the issue squarely.29 
In 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court recognized the federal govern-
ment’s ability to enforce the CSA with respect to intrastate manufacturing and 
possession of medical marijuana in compliance with state law when such ac-
tivity is rationally related to regulation of interstate commerce in marijuana.30 
                                                                                                                           
 25 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (explaining that “the Constitution has 
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern accord-
ing to Congress’ instructions”). 
 26 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1996) (holding that “[t]he Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulato-
ry program”). 
 27 Although usually raised by the right on the political spectrum, in the marijuana context the 
banner of “states’ rights” has been applied to marijuana decriminalization by those to the left. For 
example, under the Obama administration, the White House expressed strong opposition to Con-
gressional attempts at interfering with marijuana decriminalization in the District of Columbia, 
stating quite clearly that decriminalization efforts were a states’ rights issue. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 2.  
 28 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (Apr. 22, 1820), available at http://teaching
americanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-john-holmes/ [https://perma.cc/QD8Z-YFVY]. 
 29 See Mikos, supra note 1, at 7. 
 30 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2004) (holding that the CSA can still be applied to 
intrastate manufacturing and possession of medical marijuana, even if it is in compliance with 
state law). 
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Nonetheless, it did not directly address the question of whether the CSA 
preempts state marijuana laws.31 There are state court decisions that abrogate 
state laws protecting medical marijuana users from employment discrimina-
tion32 and laws licensing marijuana distributors; but these, also, do not con-
front the central issue.33 Other state court cases have rejected the preemption 
arguments of local government officials, but the U.S Supreme Court has de-
nied certiorari in all of these.34 Meanwhile, some state marijuana reform laws 
have met a better fate when faced with preemption challenges.35 
It is difficult to discern with any confidence a trend line. The ongoing 
gyrations and vacillations, particularly in state court jurisprudence, mean that 
all bets are off. There is also no consensus on these issues in the academic 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1490 (2006) (“[Raich] neither declared California’s law invalid on 
preemption or any other grounds nor gave any indication that California officials must assist in the 
enforcement of the CSA.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 523–28 (refusing to extend state employ-
ment discrimination law to include employees using medical marijuana, as the use of medical 
marijuana is not authorized under the CSA); Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 134 P.3d 
161, 166 (Or. 2006) (Kistler, J., concurring) (“Federal law preempts state employment discrimina-
tion law to the extent that it requires employers to accommodate medical marijuana use.”); see 
Mikos, supra note 1, at 14. 
 33 See Haumant v. Griffin, 699 N.W.2d 774, 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (indicating that if a 
proposed charter directing the Minneapolis City Council to “‘authorize, license, and regulate a 
reasonable number of medical marijuana distribution centers in the City of Minneapolis’ were to 
pass, it would be, at least for now, in conflict with current federal law and would thus be ‘without 
effect’”) (internal citations omitted)); Mikos, supra note 1, at 14 (citing Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
638–42 (holding a medical marijuana permit scheme to be preempted by the CSA)). 
 34 See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 
UCLA L. REV. 74, 101 (2015) (describing the lack of a federal court opinion about the broad 
argument that any initiatives that “tax and regulate” marijuana create a direct conflict with federal 
law); see also Ter Beek, 846 N.W.2d at 544 (holding that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act 
was not preempted by the CSA); San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 481–83 (holding that 
provisions allowing patients to obtain medical marijuana identification cards did not positively 
conflict with the CSA, as simultaneous compliance with both sets of laws was not impossible, and 
that the identification card provisions did not pose a significant obstacle to the CSA’s objectives); 
City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 669 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
623 (2008) (holding that a medical marijuana user was qualified to invoke the protections of Cali-
fornia’s medical marijuana law, was entitled under state law to the return of the seized marijuana, 
and the return of the marijuana was not precluded by federal preemption because the possession of 
the drug was legally sanctioned under state law). 
 35 See White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 386 P.3d 416, 419 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2016) (holding that the CSA does not preempt the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act); Kirby v. 
County of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 831–32 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding, in part, that the CSA 
did not preempt California’s statutory limitation on marijuana arrests under the Compassionate 
Use Act and Medical Marijuana Program Act (“MMPA”)); Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of 
Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 92 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that California’s decriminalization of 
specific medical marijuana activities under the MMPA was not preempted by the CSA). 
902 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:895 
literature, and until the Supreme Court steps in, the uncertainty is destined to 
continue.36 
II. VERTICAL PREEMPTION 
Why is there so much disagreement about state decriminalization of ma-
rijuana? The law of vertical preemption—preemption of state law by incon-
sistent federal law under the Supremacy Clause—is fairly well established, 
and it seems safe to assume that the marijuana issue is not going to trigger a 
major doctrinal revolt. “Well established,” however, does not mean “well un-
derstood” or even “well articulated.” At the root of the problem are important 
matters that current preemption doctrine leaves obscure; some of the confu-
sion about marijuana decriminalization is a consequence of these gaps in un-
derstanding. 
Part II begins by identifying some of the premises that are responsible, 
premises that are foundational for preemption generally and not only mariju-
ana decriminalization. Several unresolved but important issues are in this way 
brought into focus. These include: 
• First, can a challenge based on the Supremacy Clause draw strength 
from a pattern of popular hostility to the central government, if that es-
tablishes a motive for adopting the challenged law? If not, then what is 
the relevance (if any) of a general political climate of hostility to federal 
law? 
• Second, is the challenged state law supposed to be evaluated relative to 
the preexisting law of that state, to having no law at all on the subject, or 
to something else (such as the federal law itself)? 
• Third, how intelligible generally are the assignments of orders of magni-
tude to the state’s undercutting of federal law? 
A. Vertical Preemption Generally 
Some of the basic principles of preemption law are fairly obvious. 
Preemption is an issue only where there is overlapping governmental authori-
ty.37 Where, for jurisdictional or other reasons, there is only one source of law 
that might apply, the result of a dispute is dictated by what that one unargua-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Mikos, supra note 1, at 7 (comparing Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 646, which found that 
federal law preempted a local marijuana dispensary permit program, with City of Lake Forest v. 
Evergreen Holistic Collective, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 361 n.12 (Ct. App. 2012), review granted 
and opinion superseded by, 275 P.3d 1266 (Cal. 2012), which found that federal law did not 
preempt the local permit program). 
 37 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 82 (1824) (estab-
lishing the supremacy of the federal government in a conflict between state and federal powers). 
2017] Federal Preemption and State Decriminalization of Marijuana 903 
bly applicable law provides.38 Such cases can be resolved without any refer-
ence to preemption. Indeed, mention of preemption would be nothing but a 
diversion. This is a point to which to which this Article will return.39 
In the case of marijuana regulation, both federal and state laws apply to 
the conduct giving rise to the prosecution—that is, to the possession, cultiva-
tion, or sale of marijuana.40 Where the state still criminalizes that conduct, it 
will be illegal under both federal law and the law of a state. Where the state 
has decriminalized marijuana, possession and sale will still be governed by 
two laws; it is just that one makes the conduct criminal and the other does 
not. 
In such cases, the Supremacy Clause affirms that federal law is superior 
to state law and overrides “anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to 
the contrary notwithstanding.”41 A central question is therefore whether the 
challenged state law is something “to the contrary.” If the state law requires 
the individual to do something that federal law prohibits (or vice versa) the 
case for preemption is easily made. It has long been clear, and there continues 
to be no dispute, that the states cannot do that.42 
But most cases are not so clear; mostly it is possible for the individual to 
comply with both. Although it might at first seem obvious that state decrimi-
nalization law is “to the contrary”—decriminalization policy is “pro-
                                                                                                                           
 38 Jurisdiction may be lacking for reasons of Due Process or because the federal Constitution 
does not supply a basis for a particular federal law in its enumerated powers. See infra note 88 and 
accompanying text (describing the federal enumerated powers and suggesting that others may be 
left to the states). Such reasons for challenging applicability of a statute are not relevant here; this 
Article will consider only cases in which state and federal jurisdiction to apply their drug laws 
undeniably exists. Where only one authority has jurisdiction, it is not necessary to consider 
preemption challenges and the decision can be made on purely jurisdictional grounds. 
 39 See infra Part III.A (describing that preemption is an issue only when there is more than 
one law that might apply). 
 40 The result is concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute violation of the drug laws (should the 
prosecutor choose to do so) and the discretion to impose two successive sentences. The Double 
Jeopardy clause does not prohibit successive prosecutions by the state and federal government, nor 
by different states. The theory of “dual sovereignty” results in every one being a different crime if 
it was an offense against a different state. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (holding 
that separate prosecutions for the same conduct by two states were not barred by the Double Jeop-
ardy clause); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (holding that separate prosecutions 
for the same conduct by a state and the federal government was not barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Double Jeopardy clause). 
 41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 42 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509 (1956) (holding that state acts conflict with 
a federal plan and the dominant interest of the Federal government precludes state interest); Peo-
ple v. Giese, 408 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that the promulgated state 
safety standards was not in conflict with the administration of the Federal program, so the Federal 
program did not preempt the state standards). 
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marijuana” and federal policy is “anti-marijuana”—this is not necessarily the 
way to conceptualize the problem. Three points are relevant here. 
First, it can be argued, all that the state law says is that possession of pot 
is not against the law of Colorado. Federal law says that pot is, nonetheless, 
against the law of the United States, this “federal criminality” is not “contra-
ry” to its lawfulness under the law of Colorado. There are plenty of things 
that are unlawful under federal law but not state law or vice versa.43 And an 
even better analogy (so the argument might go) is to unlawful activities tak-
ing place in two different states, for example, a conspiracy, entered into in one 
state (Alpha) in order to commit a crime in taking effect in another state (Be-
ta). Obviously, the conspiratorial conduct and its consequences might be ille-
gal under the laws of one but not the other. The Supreme Court has defended 
this “dual sovereignty” rationale in both the federal/state and state/state con-
texts, holding that successive federal and state, or different state prosecutions, 
do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.44 
Second, the conflict of laws context has a long tradition of not expecting 
one sovereign to enforce the criminal law of another. This “penal law excep-
tion” apparently continues to be good law.45 Given the high probability that 
each state actually prefers to enforce its own penal law, the minor digression 
from standard Full Faith and Credit practice seems justified. As party to every 
criminal case, the state would naturally want control over how a criminal case 
proceeds. At issue are matters such as prosecutorial discretion whether to 
bring a case, the decision whether to plea bargain, and allocating sufficient 
                                                                                                                           
 43 For example, immigration law has long been seen as under the federal power. See Arizona 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that the federal government has significant 
power to regulate immigration and an Arizona law (S.B. 1070) to regulate illegal immigration 
undermined federal law and was thus preempted). Additionally, many states prohibit employment 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, but no federal statute currently 
does so. See Elizabeth K. Ehret, Note, Legal Loophold: How LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws 
Leave Out the Partners of Transgender People, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 469, 480–81 (2015) (de-
scribing various state employment protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity, as 
well as proposed federal statutes). 
 44 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing the dual sovereignty which allows 
concurrent federal and state enforcement of marijuana laws to exist without violating the Double 
Jeopardy clause). 
 45 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 74–75 (1825) (establishing this principle in a con-
flict with foreign nations). The “penal law exception” is the principle that one nation or sovereign 
will not enforce the criminal laws of another nation or sovereign. Milwaukee County v. M.E. 
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 274–75 (1935) (“[T]o this rule taxing statutes constitute an exception, 
analogous to that relating to penal laws, because the courts of one state should not be called upon 
to scrutinize the relations of a foreign state with its own citizens . . . .”); Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) at 74–75; Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., of London, Eng., 184 N.E. 
152, 159 (Mass. 1933) (“The cause of action must be not founded upon a penal statute of a foreign 
State, nor contrary to the policy of our law.”). 
2017] Federal Preemption and State Decriminalization of Marijuana 905 
resources to put on its best case. Control can best be maintained in the state’s 
own courts, using its own trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, juries, 
and provisions for appellate review.46 
Third, the phrase “to the contrary” does not mean simply that a chal-
lenged state law is different from federal law; the existence of a difference can 
pretty much be taken for granted. If that was all that should be required, exist-
ing decisional law on preemption has all rather widely missed its mark. All of 
the existing cases could have been much more easily decided on the grounds 
that the two laws were different; but the Court has not taken up that rather 
simplistic approach. Instead, existing precedents all in one way or another 
assess whether the objectives of the federal law are in some way undermined 
by the state legislation.47 Does the state’s adoption of the challenged law 
make it somehow more difficult, expensive, or otherwise impractical, for the 
federal government to accomplish its objectives? 
The central challenge in preemption jurisprudence is to define what this 
means. To establish preemption, in what way and to what degree would the 
challenged authority have to be making the federal government’s job more 
difficult? Preemption challenges are, at the most fundamental level, about 
states doing things that are either more or less helpful to the projects under-
taken by the federal government. In the marijuana context, the federal gov-
ernment has set out to deter drug use by penalizing possession, cultivation, or 
sale of certain controlled substances. If a state decides to criminalize the same 
drug (so the argument goes) this will have additional deterrent effect and as-
sist the federal government in accomplishing its objectives. If it repeals its 
criminal law on the subject, the argument continues, this undercuts the federal 
objective and the state repeal must be invalidated. 
                                                                                                                           
 46 It might be relevant to point out here that federal courts have been given exclusive jurisdic-
tion over federal crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012) (“The district courts of the United States shall 
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of 
the United States.”). 
 47 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (stating that 
preemption exists when “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” (alterations in original)); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (“We ex-
amine these Acts only to determine the congressional plan. Looking to all of them in the aggre-
gate, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress has intended to occupy the field of sedition. 
Taken as a whole, they evince a congressional plan which makes it reasonable to determine that 
no room has been left for the States to supplement it. Therefore, a state sedition statute is super-
seded regardless of whether it purports to supplement the federal law.”); Charleston & W. Caroli-
na Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) (“When Congress has taken the 
particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not 
to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.”). 
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The Supreme Court has periodically attempted to formulate a standard 
for determining how obstructionist the state law would have to be.48 None of 
its proposals have made the task much easier for the lower court judges who, 
unlike academics, do not revel in doctrinal obscurities. There may be reasons 
why, reasons which are illustrated by the interaction of federal and state mari-
juana law. The following considers three unanswered questions that, if more 
were known about them, might shine some light on the preemption doctrine. 
1. The Relevance of Motive 
The first of these is whether the question of preemption can really be 
considered out of context, that is, without any consideration of the general 
wave of hostility that some portions of the American public purport to feel 
towards the federal government.49 The claim that a particular reform proposal 
violates the Supremacy Clause is arguably bolstered by the motivation of its 
sponsors: a very un-supremacy-clause-like desire to protect states’ rights and 
to reduce “unwarranted intrusion” by the central government into the lives of 
the state’s citizens. 
The claim would go as follows. What makes a state law supportive or 
unsupportive of federal law is only in part a precise comparison of the state’s 
law’s terms to the federal’s. It would be foolish to divorce the marijuana re-
form bills from their social and political context and consider them in a vacu-
um. The context, it could be argued, includes the general atmosphere of hos-
tility to Washington that is felt in some quarters, often the states where liber-
tarian sentiment has supported decriminalization. How can it be denied that 
an “anti-supremacy-clause” mood is in the air, and how can this be ignored? 
It should count against the constitutionality of that law. 
The fact that some of these reforms were adopted through the referen-
dum process may matter because it increases the likelihood that the decision 
was based in part on hostility to the central government rather than informed 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (stating that preemption exists when “under the circumstances 
of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (alterations in original)); N.W. Cent. 
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989) (preemption exists 
when “Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no 
room for the States to supplement federal law”). For a recent treatment of these formulations, see 
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (combining the standards from 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council and Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. 
Commission of Kansas). 
 49 The question of motive is, for reasons explained below, of interest in the marijuana context 
because of the salience of the issue politically. See infra notes 50–66 and accompanying text 
(describing the issue of legislative motive and how it has been utilized in the constitutional 
analysis by the Court). It may not be an issue of concern in all preemption contexts. 
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political choice. Legislators supposedly base their votes on reasoned delibera-
tion about facts put into a public record by themselves and their colleagues. 
Whatever one thinks of this premise, it seems more plausible than the analo-
gous argument about individual voters, who are not required to display any 
particular qualification other than their right to vote in general elections. 
Campaign rhetoric, in fact, often displays hostility to the federal government 
openly, as a selling point. This would seem to be exactly the sort of danger 
that the Supremacy Clause was adopted to guard against. 
It seems likely that some of the preemption challengers who find it ob-
vious that decriminalization violates the Supremacy Clause are influenced by 
the current atmosphere of distrust for Washington. It is an appealingly com-
monsensical position. Given that such anti-Washington sentiment does exist, 
and is capable of swaying elections in at least some cases, it is worth asking 
whether, even in theory, an atmosphere of hostility should be taken into ac-
count in preemption challenges where it can be shown. Should courts admit 
and consider evidence on this issue; should trial judges make findings of fact 
to this effect? They mostly haven’t, at least not so far. 
The most frequently heard version of the reasons why they do not con-
cerns illicit motivation. When a statute’s constitutionality is challenged, one is 
told that evidence of legislators’ illicit motivation is generally not welcome. 
Note that evidence of motivation of the executive, where the issue is validity 
of an executive order, may be treated differently. So-called legislative motive 
is a fiction, because a collective body does not have a motivation the way that 
a single individual does. But it is not a fiction to ask the motivation of the 
executive, even the motive of a small group of individuals in the office of the 
executive, because those individuals’ wills are all subordinate to the wishes of 
the executive. In contrast, legislators are all entitled to their own different 
opinions and to speak of a collective motive is typically not possible.  
This includes motivation of many different sorts. Legislation may argu-
ably have been motivated by discrimination against racial or ethnic groups; 
by a desire to undercut the opposing political party’s electoral position; or by 
irrational and unscientific popular beliefs about climate change, the causes of 
autism, or evolution. To the extent that it is political animosity, or hostility to 
science or religious bigotry that accounts for such laws, as opposed to merely 
mistaken science, such motivations do not as a rule count in the constitutional 
calculus. The Supreme Court has made this clear. 
The Court traces its position back almost to the earliest days of the Re-
public.50 So long as legislation serves a facially legitimate purpose, it is said, 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. House Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977) 
(“This Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, [10 U.S.] (6 Cranch) 87, 130–31 (1810) 
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it is not to be challenged by questioning the legislators’ motives. In part, this 
is for practical reasons, for as the Court has noted, “It is difficult or impossi-
ble for any court to determine the ‘sole’ or ‘dominant’ motivation behind the 
choices of a group of legislators. . . . [T]here is an element of futility in a ju-
dicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its support-
ers.”51 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in United States v. O’Brien 
in 1968, reiterated these concerns while adding another.52 A statute invalidat-
ed on one occasion might have to be upheld after a second enactment, when 
legislators were more cautious about public expression of their unsavory 
opinions.53 
                                                                                                                           
. . . , that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion 
into the workings of other branches of government.” (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971))); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 
41, 46–48, 55 (1986) (referencing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–86 (1968), and 
holding that a zoning ordinance, which prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating 
within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or 
school, was a valid governmental response to the “admittedly serious problems” created by adult 
theaters and did not violate the First Amendment). 
 51 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); see also O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (“It is a 
familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitu-
tional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”); McCray v. United States, 195 
U.S. 27, 56 (1904) (“The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to 
the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that 
a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”). This principle also applies to 
actions against individual legislators that were involved in the enactment of challenged legislation. 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (reiterating Fletcher v. Peck that the motives of 
legislators are irrelevant to a determination of the privilege applied to individual legislators); see 
also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 823 (2d ed. 1988) (“Among the most 
telling objections to judicial review of legislative motive is the difficulty of ferreting out the real 
purpose of a collective lawmaking body, particularly if it must be inferred from the articulated 
remarks of a few legislators.”). 
 52 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383. 
 53 Chief Justice Warren wrote, 
Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the 
issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by 
legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to 
sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibil-
ity of misreading Congress’ purpose. It is an entirely different matter when we are 
asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, 
on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What moti-
vates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what moti-
vates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew 
guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation 
which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in 
its exact form if the same or another legislator made a “wiser” speech about it. 
Id. at 383–84; see also Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225 (“If the law is struck down for this reason, rather 
than because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature 
or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons.”); TRIBE, supra note 51, at 823.  
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There are what appear to be exceptions to this general rule, which vary 
by substantive context. One concerns facial discrimination on the basis of 
race.54 In 1977, in Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp., an Equal Protection case, the Supreme Court first recog-
nized that as a general matter legislative motivation was customarily not rele-
vant: “[B]ecause legislators and administrators are properly concerned with 
balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from re-
viewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irra-
tionality.”55 But Equal Protection challenges required a different approach. 
Because “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause[,] . . . [w]hen there is a proof 
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, 
this judicial deference is no longer justified.”56 
A steady string of gerrymandering cases confirms, similarly, that politi-
cal motivations are not subjected to strict scrutiny, but that strict scrutiny can 
apply when race is found to be the “the predominant factor” motivating the 
drawing of district lines.57 In First Amendment cases a balance must be 
                                                                                                                           
 54 After generally rejecting the relevance of motivation to constitutional questions, the Court 
in United States v. O’Brien noted in a footnote that in a “very limited and well-defined class of 
cases” motivation “may” be cognizable because “the very nature of the constitutional question 
requires an inquiry into legislative purpose,” such as those cases in which statutes have been chal-
lenged as bills of attainder or cases determining whether a statute was punitive in nature. See 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84 n.30 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169–84 
(1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95–97 (1958); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)). 
Washington v. Davis elaborated in a footnote: 
To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that legislative 
purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior cases—as indicated in 
the text—are to the contrary; and very shortly after Palmer, all Members of the 
Court majority in that case joined the Court’s opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 . . . (1971), which dealt with the issue of public financing for private 
schools and which announced, as the Court had several times before, that the validi-
ty of public aid to church-related schools includes close inquiry into the purpose of 
the challenged statute. 
426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976). 
 55 See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
 56 See id. at 265–66. 
 57 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (requiring, for a finding of “discriminatory 
purpose,” evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or direct evidence going to legislative 
purpose is necessary). As stated by the Court in Bush v. Vera in 1996, “Strict scrutiny would not be 
appropriate if race-neutral, traditional districting considerations predominated over racial ones. We 
have not subjected political gerrymandering to strict scrutiny.” See 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (citing 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (White, J., plurality opinion) (“[U]nconstitutional 
discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently 
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”)); Bandemer, 
478 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[P]urely political gerrymandering claims” 
are not justiciable.). As reaffirmed by the Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer in 2004, “[S]etting out to segre-
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struck, because “governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to 
ensure that communication has not been prohibited ‘merely because public 
officials disapprove [sic] the speakers’ views.’”58 The Court has recognized 
the inevitability of being influenced by legislative motive but has attempted 
to conduct the examination in a “deferential and limited” manner.59 And a 
number of cases suggest that an inquiry into legislative purpose should con-
sider only objective evidence of intent.60 
To summarize, the most substantial reasons for reluctance to take politi-
cal atmosphere into account are these: empirical uncertainty about the true 
motivations of most of the decisionmakers; the particular difficulties with 
making the necessary empirical determinations in decriminalization by refer-
endum; judicial deference to the government’s elected branches; and the like-
lihood that this basis for decision would require an opposite result in succes-
sive cases where a more careful legislative history had been built. 
There are good reasons to discount constitutionally a general atmosphere 
of political animosity towards a distant bureaucracy, even where it might be 
argued that such hostility was the very reason that the Supremacy Clause was 
necessary.61 Should decriminalization of marijuana be unconstitutional be-
cause it was motivated in part by resentment, cultural alienation, or, most im-
portantly, belief in an out-of-control federal government having overstepped 
                                                                                                                           
gate voters by race is unlawful and hence rare, and setting out to segregate them by political affilia-
tion is (so long as one doesn’t go too far) lawful and hence ordinary.” 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004). 
 58 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (citing Nie-
motko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Goldberg v. 
Whitman, 743 F. Supp. 943, 951 (D. Conn. 1990) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384) (“[T]o base 
a constitutional decision on what a legislature really meant is necessarily ‘a hazardous matter.’”). 
 59 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (recognizing the 
caution necessary in assessing the proper public purpose of a statute); see also id. (“[A] court has 
no license to psychoanalyze the legislators.”). 
 60 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The relevant issue is whether an ob-
jective observer, acquainted with the test, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, 
would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in the schools.”); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.24 (1979) (citing Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; 
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1945)) (noting that “[p]roof of discriminatory intent 
must necessarily usually rely on objective factors . . . . What a legislature or any official entity is 
‘up to’ may be plain from the results its actions achieve, or the results they avoid.”); Goldberg, 
743 F. Supp. at 952 (describing the cases laying out this limitation on the inquiry into legislative 
purpose). 
 61 The wording of the Clause does not lend itself to any particular interpretation that would 
support an exception for evidence of hostility to the federal government. It states, “This Constitu-
tion, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law 
of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
2017] Federal Preemption and State Decriminalization of Marijuana 911 
its narrow, enumerated, powers? It does not seem that this situation warrants 
another exception to the general disregard for legislative motivation. 
But something that looks somewhat like motive may be more important 
to the preemption decision. Long settled authority holds that Congressional 
intent to preempt state law (or not to preempt it) will be honored.62 Congres-
sional silence on the desire to preempt is something that might be informa-
tive, in particular in a period of great public interest and debate.63 This is not 
because of the preferences and objectives that it reveals in individual legisla-
tors; that would be motive.64 The better reason would be, instead, that general 
public hostility or support for decriminalization is somehow an indication of 
what we generally refer to as “Congressional intent.” Because Congress has 
the power to decide the issue, its failure to do so has substantive implications 
for interpretation of the matter.65 This Article will return to this point, because 
in this respect vertical and horizontal preemption are different.66 
2. The Problem of Baselines 
The second of these reasons relates to baselines, namely, the standard of 
comparison against which the state’s challenged law must be judged. 
What does it mean to characterize a state law as being “helpful” to fed-
eral policy; or conversely, for the state law to “undermine” or “undercut” fed-
eral objectives? One source of uncertainty may be empirical. There are seri-
ous factual questions any time that there is disagreement over the utility of a 
particular state legislative act on some federal objective. Does an increase in 
the minimum wage result in more unemployment? Does capital punishment 
deter serious crimes? Do marijuana smokers end up addicted to opiates? The 
                                                                                                                           
 62 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (“If the statute contains an 
express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on 
the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-
emptive intent.”). 
 63 See John David Ohlendorf, Against Coherence in Statutory Interpretation, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 735, 750–57 (interpreting Congress’ silence on certain preemption matters); Carlos 
Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1270 (2001) (describing the Su-
preme Court’s reliance on congressional silence in determining the displacement of state law in 
the area of foreign affairs); see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388 (striking down the Massachusetts 
Burma law on the question of preemption in the face of congressional silence); Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (upholding a sole executive agreement suspending private 
claims against Iran because Congress had failed to object to it).  
 64 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (describing the general rule that inquiries 
into legislators’ individual motives are not welcome in determining the constitutionality of a stat-
ute). 
 65 See Ohlendorf, supra note 63, at 750–57 (discussing how to interpret Congressional si-
lence). 
 66 See infra Part III.A.2 (comparing vertical and horizontal preemption). 
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uncertainties are endless. These are not the only concerns. Questions would 
continue to exist even if all the empirical answers were undisputed. 
The most straightforward way to evaluate the utility of state law to fed-
eral policy is to compare it to its alternatives. In most cases, an assertion of 
helpfulness or unhelpfulness is at ground level a comparative assessment, a 
relative statement about whether some proposed alternative is better or worse 
than something else. Thus if Congress decides that Obamacare is a bad idea 
this boils down to a claim that no legislation at all would be preferable to hav-
ing the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in effect. There is no absolute scale 
from which some abstract measure of utility can be meaningfully assigned. 
The “something else” is usually the status quo. If trying to decide 
whether to adopt some proposal, one usually has as an alternative simply 
leaving things as they are. One would only adopt a proposal if it compared 
favorably to what one has now. But there are also situations where a different 
comparison must be made. For example, Congress might be considering re-
placing the ACA with one of several different approaches to health insurance: 
totally free market, allowing health insurance to be sold in interstate com-
merce, or tax sheltered health care accounts. Each of the pairs of proposals 
(status quo versus total free market; health accounts versus interstate insur-
ance, etc.) would have to be assessed and the relative costs and benefits as-
sessed.67 
Where one comes out on the policy recommendations depends on how 
each alternative is analyzed on its own terms, but also on how the possible 
alternatives compare. The free market alternative might be more desirable 
than the ACA (according to majorities in the House and Senate) but less de-
sirable than health care accounts. The same is true when one asks whether 
some state statute should be preempted by federal legislation. The question 
“is this state statute going to undercut federal law” has a relative element to it. 
The following illustrates an example. 
Assume that it is 1950 and Alpha is about to adopt legislation criminal-
izing various drugs, including marijuana. The federal government already 
does so. The state adopts a rule that provides penalties for possession and 
sale, but these are not as draconian as the federal penalties. For purposes of 
simplification, assume that this means that the federal penalty is five years 
and the state penalty only three. Naturally, ranking the state and federal au-
thorities by a comparison of penalties is a simplification. Other factors that 
would have to be taken into account would include: the availability of legal 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Note that this Article does not address any possible complications resulting from Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social 
Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328 (1950) (arguing that any method of aggregating individual prefer-
ences is either irrational or has otherwise undesirable properties). 
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defenses to prosecution; the amount of drugs sold that would be necessary to 
prove the offense; etc. But this simplification is enough to illustrate the point 
at issue here, which is the changing nature of the relative assessment over 
time. 
In 1965 the legislature of Alpha reduces the severity of its law, dropping 
the penalty for simple possession to six months. Then in 1980 the penalty 
named in the statute is again increased, this time to eight years, and in 1995 
the statute is repealed altogether. As of the end of the story, Alpha has no law 
criminalizing possession or sale of marijuana. The question now arises, is 
Alpha law, or any part of it, preempted by the consistent federal standard of a 
five-year prison term? The question has several parts. 
a. Is the Pre-1950 Version of Alpha Law Preempted? 
The pre-1950 version of Alpha law should not be invalidated as 
preempted. If it were invalid, then every time that the federal government 
adopted a statute that was new or different from the law of particular states, 
those states would have to adopt a copy of it. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that state governments could not be “commandeered” into taking 
action in support of federal policies.68 Preempting the pre-1950 version of 
Alpha law would violate this principle. 
b. Is the 1950 Version of Alpha Law Preempted? 
It is also hard to argue that the 1950 version of the statute is preempted. 
Without it, Alpha would have no marijuana law at all. If, as is sometimes as-
serted, the federal government depends on state enforcement to achieve its 
drug-deterrent policies, it is better off with the 1950 version than the status 
quo ante—that is, with nothing. From the federal point of view, it is still less 
desirable than copying the federal drug law standard would be. No reported 
cases are known in which preemption was held to invalidate a state law com-
parable to Alpha’s, where the new law brought it closer to the federal law 
than it had been before. 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that “[t]he Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulato-
ry program”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (explaining that “the Consti-
tution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to gov-
ern according to Congress’ instructions”). 
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c. Is the 1965 Version of Alpha Law Preempted? 
The case for preemption here is somewhat stronger. If one compares the 
new version of the law to the previous (1950) version, it seems that the state 
legislature has done something that undercuts the federal drug-deterrence ob-
jective. But the state is still apparently contributing to the federal effort to 
some degree. No cases resemble the 1965 pattern in which the state statute 
was invalidated on preemption grounds. 
d. Is the 1980 Version of Alpha Law Preempted? 
The state law here also seems unlikely to succumb to preemption chal-
lenge. It not only raises the level of contribution that the state makes to the 
federal drug deterrence project, it even exceeds what the federal government 
is doing. This Article will return to this question later; it can be argued that 
Alpha is undercutting federal policy by adopting law that is so much more 
stringent than the federal rule.69 But it is doubtful that the state statute in 
question would be invalidated on preemption grounds. 
e. Is the 1995 Version of Alpha Law Preempted? 
This is the case most nearly resembling the current situation; in 1995 
Alpha repeals its laws altogether. Some people argue that this should be 
preempted, because by repealing its statute, Alpha undercuts federal policy. 
The end result of the repeal, however, is to leave Alpha in exactly the same 
position it was in just prior to the 1950 adoption of the original state drug law. 
Moreover, if preemption is established simply because the state reduced its 
level of support for the federal policy, then it would be necessary to invalidate 
the law revisions of 1965, as well. Most peculiar of all, it seems that Alpha’s 
law will be invalidated simply because it at one point raised its drug deter-
rence efforts closer to the federal level. If it had simply never adopted any 
drug laws at all, it would indisputably escape a preemption challenge. 
3. The Magnitude of the State’s Failure to Cooperate 
To make comparisons between different state laws that show disregard 
or disrespect for federal projects, one has to be able to somehow measure 
magnitude, at least as a relative matter. Otherwise it is impossible to describe 
unsupportiveness on federal projects as “minimal,” for example, or “substan-
tial.” Case law does not generally address the methodological meaningfulness 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See infra Part II.A.3 (describing problems with assessing the magnitude of the state’s inter-
ference with federal law in preemption cases). 
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of such assessments, but it is clear enough that the magnitude of the state in-
terference with federal objectives should somehow be taken into account.70 
To allow any impingement at all to suffice for preemption would be untena-
ble; as the following suggests, it would have the effect of invalidating almost 
everything. 
But the prospect of assessing the magnitude of a state law’s interference 
raises questions. First, one usually thinks of the policy underlying marijuana 
prohibition as deterring marijuana use. That is only one side of the equation. 
The federal government did not set out to deter marijuana use at any price. It 
could probably deter drug use effectively by immediately executing all indi-
viduals found with drugs in their possession, without regard for the amount of 
illegal drugs involved or any other mitigating factors.71 After a certain point, 
however, the cost is too high and the benefits too low. One should take the 
policies supporting limits on the severity of federal criminalization into ac-
count, as well as policies supporting the criminalization in the first place.72 
So, for example, if the state is considering adopting a law that would 
provide criminal penalties for marijuana distribution, it is more closely in line 
with the federal policy (and should be less likely to be held preempted) if the 
state provides penalties that are neither too high or too low (in terms of their 
comparison to the federal penalties). An absurdly low penalty might be held 
preempted (as might a total repeal of a state criminal law) but if it is, then so 
should a disproportionately high penalty. Here, “disproportionately” means, 
in relation to the federal penalty for the same offense. 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Compare Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to 
be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended 
effects . . . .”), with Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (“Any state law, however clearly 
within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must 
yield.”). 
 71 A similar approach has been advocated by President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines. 
Jason Gutierrez, Body Count Rises as Philippine President Wages War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/asia/philippines-duterte-drug-killing.
html [https://perma.cc/WG9E-C4JM]. 
 72 Although some state courts have looked into the question of whether a lenient state law pre-
empts a lenient municipal law, there are few examples of a lenient federal law preempting a strict 
state law. See Kirby v. County of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 820 (Ct. App. 2015), review de-
nied (Feb. 17, 2016) (holding that a lenient state act does not preempt a county from banning ma-
rijuana cultivation as a public nuisance); Maral v. City of Live Oak, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 806 
(Ct. App. 2013) (holding that lenient California state statutes did not preempt a city ordinance 
banning all cultivation of marijuana). More commonly, a strict federal law has been found to con-
flict with lenient state laws. See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 230 
P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010) (holding a lenient state marijuana statute was preempted by the CSA). 
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It is important to keep in mind that federal criminal laws often provide 
sanctions in terms of an upper and lower bound.73 Presumably, the upper limit 
is crafted as carefully as the lower limit, and with just as much seriousness.74 
If the federal penalty is six months to two years, wouldn’t a state mandatory 
penalty of fifteen years seem excessive?75 Congress, after all, rejected certain 
penalties as too high. 
And it will sometimes happen that the state sanction is within the inter-
val specified by federal statute, but the total sanction occasioned by applying 
both of the laws is greater than the upper limit. For example, assume that the 
federal law provides two years to ten with the likely penalty for a particular 
defendant in a particular case being eight. If the state law provides nine years, 
then imposing both sets of sanctions results in a penalty that of seventeen 
years, which is out of the range contemplated by Congress. For the state sanc-
tion to stand, in such cases, can hardly be said to be consistent with the terms 
of the federal statute. 
As a more general matter, it is not clear whether the magnitudes of the 
different state laws are even commensurable. Statutes are not one-
dimensional; there are likely to be a variety of considerations that go into de-
termining whether a state law has departed sufficiently from its federal coun-
terpart to be preempted. But how are such differences to be determined; how 
are they to be compared? If one state’s marijuana law has great similarity to 
the federal law in terms of the lower end of permissible sanctions, but is wild-
ly off base with the federal law in terms of the upper end of the scale, is it 
more or is it less “preemption worthy” than a law with a wildly overblown 
sanction and modestly different lower bound? 
All of these open questions can present problems for other types of 
preemption cases outside the marijuana context. Indeed, they apply to a 
greater or lesser degree to phenomena from outside the federalism context. 
For example, repeal of an earlier law by a later law fits the general pattern of 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994(b)(1) (2012) (establishing that the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
must create a “sentencing range” for “each category of offense”). 
 74 See id. §§ 991, 994(p), (r), (w)(3) (showing that Congress retained the right to control the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission’s policies and created its own guidelines). 
 75 This does occasionally happen, or at any rate, something somewhat like this. In 1989, in 
Luna v. Harris, the Second Circuit examined a case in which New York conditioned take-home 
methadone privileges on the patient’s employment, where the federal statute imposed no such 
condition. Luna v. Harris, 888 F.2d 949, 950 (2d Cir. 1989). It found the state statute wasn’t 
preempted. Id. at 954. In 1993, in People v. Villacrusis, the Ninth Circuit held that a Guam statute 
prohibiting importation of methamphetamine was not preempted by the Federal Comprehensive 
Drug Prevention and Control Act. People v. Villacrusis, 992 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1993). Per-
haps most on point, an Arizona court held that the Comprehensive Drug Control Act did not 
preempt Arizona from enacting a statute with more severe penalties for narcotics importers than 
the federal penalty. State v. Dunn, 803 P.2d 917, 922 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). 
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preemption. Marijuana decriminalization is therefore a vehicle for asking 
some fairly broad questions. The marijuana example may be distinctive in 
this regard, but it would not be unique. 
III. HORIZONTAL PREEMPTION 
As one would expect from two sets of principles that share a label— 
“preemption”—vertical and horizontal preemption have much in common; 
these similarities are important. Of equal interest, though, is what makes them 
different. Horizontal federalism deals with the relations between the fifty 
states, co-equal entities that are geographically defined. Vertical federalism 
deals with relations between the states and a unique central government. 
These entities are defined by subject matter and the relationship is hierar-
chical. 
Preemption is a process of resolving the overlap of authority between 
two different sovereign entities. Preemption means that one of the actors 
dominates; the choice is between federal and state (in vertical preemption) or 
between Alpha and Beta (in horizontal preemption). Certain criteria must be 
met for preemption to occur; if they are not met, then neither sovereign 
preempts the other. Then, the eventual application of one law or the other de-
pends on happenstance, such as which forum ends up resolving the dispute. 
The word “preemption” is more frequently used in the vertical federal-
ism context than the horizontal federalism context. The reason is that vertical 
and horizontal federalism are different in the percentage of overlap cases to 
which the concept properly applies. Almost all federal/state conflicts can be 
resolved through preemption but that is true of only a small number of 
state/state disputes. This is especially true today, when a long tradition of 
search for uniform and predictable answers, defined by unique geographical 
occurrences, has largely been abandoned. 
A. Horizontal and Vertical Configurations: A Comparison 
The states of the United States are not just separate administrative re-
gions of a single nation; to a certain degree, they enjoy separate sovereignty. 
Administrative regions can have different rules of substantive conduct and 
procedural decision making, but these are subject to the will of a single cen-
tralized authority that tolerates these differences only so long as they reflect 
the centralized authority’s own priorities. The Ninth Circuit and the Second 
Circuit follow different interpretations of federal law, but only until the Su-
preme Court weighs in on which result is correct. But the law of California is 
what the courts and legislature of California say it is, by definition. The law 
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of New York is, by definition, what the New York courts and legislature want 
it to be.76 
At the outset of the discussion of vertical preemption, it was noted that 
preemption takes place within areas of overlapping jurisdiction.77 If there is 
no overlapping jurisdiction to start, then the necessary two authorities are 
lacking; one to preempt, the other to be preempted. If overlap exists, there 
may or may not be a shared solution to which state’s priorities ultimately pre-
vail—which state’s laws preempts the other’s. If there is no shared decision 
which one preempts and which one is preempted, there is no preemption. 
Horizontal and vertical preemption are not merely two variations on the 
same general theme. They are defined in profoundly different ways. The 
types of considerations which define a geographical entity are different from 
the types that define an entity with subject matter jurisdiction. Because juris-
diction at the outset is defined differently, the areas of overlap are defined 
differently as well. The resolution of the overlap must also, then, be defined 
differently. 
1. Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Overlap: the Interstate System 
The authority of the states in regard to one another is delineated by ref-
erence to geographical boundaries. There is debate within the choice of law 
field, today, over whether geographical boundaries are something of an 
anachronism. The modernists contend that jurisdiction should be defined by 
reference to people, and the interests of a state in taking care of its people by 
imposing compensatory or protective laws on appropriate interstate cases.78 
But this definition still relies on geographical boundaries, although at a deriv-
ative level. For the people that matter, even to the modernists, are the people 
of the state, meaning in essence the people who live in the state. The central 
importance of geography is unmistakable. 
In any event, the various constitutional limitations on extraterritoriality 
make clear that so far as states are concerned, territorial limits are not a thing 
                                                                                                                           
 76 This is, of course, subject to substantive constitutional limits, such as the Bill of Rights. 
 77 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing the origins of the preemption doc-
trine). 
 78 For some of the most influential arguments in this debate, see generally Brainerd Currie, 
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963) (analyzing the problem of 
the disinterested third state in conflict-of-laws theory); Herma Hill Kaye, Theory into Practice: 
Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1982) (examining the reported choice of 
law cases decided since the mid-1950s from the perspective of the court); Robert A. Sedler, Inter-
est Analysis as the Preferred Approach to Choice of Law: A Response to Professor Brilmayer’s 
“Foundational Attack,” 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 483 (1985) (arguing that interest analysis is the preferred 
approach to choice of law). 
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of the past.79 Those who say that state lines are irrelevant for choosing the 
applicable law are kidding themselves, as are those who accept, equally, its 
corollary that state interests are defined by the desire to help state residents. 
As to these, John Hart Ely once put it, “This claim is so plainly the result of 
wishful thinking that it does not merit extended rejoinder.”80 Or, in the con-
text of this Symposium, “what are they smoking?” 
This is not the place to develop a theory of what geographical connec-
tions make the state’s exercise of authority over an individual legitimate.81 
That, of course, is a topic much debated by scholars of choice of law, personal 
jurisdiction, and international law (not to mention by a number of philoso-
phers).82 That question can, for present purposes, be treated as undecided. 
But the one thing known is that the states of the United States are all 
equal, constituted politically by identical normative structures. And there is 
reason to think that at the state level, the bases for legitimacy are geograph-
ical. So one can say that a state has jurisdiction where the appropriate geo-
graphical tests are met, whether the tests depend on presence in the state, un-
dertaking actions having an impact in the state, residing in the state, residence 
of the complaining party in the state, or something similar. 
The areas of overlap include disputes that satisfy the criteria of more 
than one state. If the basis for legitimacy is an act occurring within the state, 
then the area of overlap between two states, Alpha and Beta, includes all dis-
putes that have at least one occurrence in each of those states. If there is juris-
diction over any dispute where one or the other of the parties is a resident, 
                                                                                                                           
 79 This is particularly true in the area of due process limitations on state court jurisdiction as 
to which the U.S. Supreme Court has said that territorial limits are the most important considera-
tion. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (describing the limitations on state jurisdiction 
as a result of territorial limitations). But it is also the case in due process limits on choice of law, 
the Commerce Clause, and on extraterritoriality of federal statutes internationally. 
 80 John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 173, 180 (1981). 
 81 Some of the author’s previous work has considered these questions. See generally, e.g., 
LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER 
WORLD (1994) (arguing that American hegemony is a form of international governance whose 
legitimacy must be evaluated through liberal political morality); LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989) (highlighting the distinction between the horizontal approach to 
international law, in which states are coequal actors, and the vertical approach, which is dependent 
upon the relationship between the state and the individual, raising the question of legitimacy); Lea 
Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989) (arguing that a politi-
cal rights-based approach provides suitable constraints on a policy analysis of choice of law and 
establishing basic features of the choice of law regime which could arise from such a theory of 
political rights). 
 82 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 68 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-
Merrill Educational Publishing 1952) (1690). See generally Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, 
and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1989) (citing Locke). 
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then the areas of overlap include all cases where the parties are from the two 
different states. 
The symmetry of the arrangement is what gives it its simplicity. But it 
also creates problems. Because of this symmetry, there is no obvious way to 
select between the various authorities that have jurisdiction in a particular 
case. How can you resolve the overlap? This problem has been noticed in the 
choice of law context. Under early choice of law theories, it had been as-
sumed that only one state could have jurisdiction over a particular case.83 But 
eventually, the Court found explicitly that there are cases over which more 
than one state has jurisdiction consistent with the U.S. Constitution.84 It then 
noted that the Full Faith and Credit Clause could not be read to compel one 
state to apply the law of the other. If the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires 
Alpha to apply the law of Beta, then it also requires Beta to apply the law of 
Alpha. The result would be ridiculous. Because of the symmetry of the situa-
tion, it would be impossible to find a way to resolve disputes in the area of 
overlap. 
To resolve such disputes, there must either be some categorical hierar-
chy or there must be a case-by-case method of allocating disputes in the over-
lap area to one state or the other. The most obvious way of doing so would be 
to recognize that some connections are more important than others. If Alpha 
is connected to the dispute by the residence of the plaintiff, and Beta is con-
nected to the dispute because it is the place where the objectionable conduct 
occurred, then this dispute probably falls under the area of overlap defined by 
the Due Process Clause limits on jurisdiction. The Due Process Clause does 
not single out one state over the other. What would single out one state would 
be a reason for prioritizing territorial connecting factors over one’s based on 
residence (or vice versa). 
To the extent that the states have agreed to do this, expressly or by im-
plication, the area of overlap is resolved. When the area of overlap is re-
solved, it is possible to talk about preemption. Both states have agreed that 
                                                                                                                           
 83 LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 11–41 
(2d ed. 1991) (describing the history and modern theories of choice of law). 
 84 Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) (“While the 
purpose of that provision was to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and 
judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in other states, the very 
nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, 
precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute 
the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is 
competent to legislate.”); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 540–
41 (1935) (“[W]here the contract is entered into within the state, even though it is to be performed 
elsewhere, its terms, its obligation, and its sanctions are subject, in some measure, to the legisla-
tive control of the state. The fact that the contract is to be performed elsewhere does not of itself 
put these incidents beyond reach of the power which a state may constitutionally exercise.”). 
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the law of the state where the activity occurred preempts the law of the state 
where the plaintiff resides. Thus, where there is agreement of this sort, one 
might say that territory preempts residence. The Supreme Court has in fact 
elevated territory to hierarchically superior status under the Commerce 
Clause, in cases concerning voting rights in corporations and pricing of liq-
uor.85 
Such an inference can be particularly plausible when important rights 
are involved. Some rights are such that a state has an affirmative desire to 
protect the exercise of the right within its territory. If this is a reasonable in-
ference, as it seems to be given the constitutional structure of rights of this 
sort, preemption is justified. The conclusion follows from the hierarchically 
superior status of territorial factors over personal connections, together with 
the compelling need to have a single solution for both states to recognize.86 
Choosing a single connecting factor to resolve disputes between states 
can be an ideal solution to the problem of overlap. The selection of one factor 
results in a selection of one state, because if the geographical factor establish-
es a connection between Alpha and the dispute it necessarily fails to establish 
a connection between Beta and the dispute. The same would not be true in the 
Federal State system, where both the state and Federal government may have 
a connection of a territorial sort with the dispute.87 In this respect, as in many 
others, the vertical arrangements made for our federal system are different 
from the horizontal ones. 
2. Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Overlap: the Federal/State System 
Compared 
Federal authority in regard to the states is of course not defined geo-
graphically (although in regard to foreign nations the division is primarily 
geographic). In the context of federal/state relations, federal government ju-
risdiction exists when an issue area falls within one of the national govern-
ment’s enumerated powers, as defined by the Constitution. These powers in-
                                                                                                                           
 85 Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989) (holding that Connecticut’s beer-price 
affirmation statute created competing local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was 
meant to preclude); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93–94 (1987) (holding 
that an Indiana state law regarding controlling corporate shares was not pre-empted by the federal 
Williams Act governing hostile corporate stock tender offers because the purposes of the state law 
were consistent with the federal law). 
 86 See generally Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, 
and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873 (1993) (evaluating whether states can regulate their 
local residents’ reproductive rights when they are temporarily in other states). 
 87 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompany text (establishing the im-
portance of territoriality in jurisdictional issues). 
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clude the familiar regulation of interstate commerce, foreign affairs, immigra-
tion and naturalization, coinage of money, and so forth. 
Overlap is defined by two conditions. This is because to belong in the 
overlap a dispute must be subject to jurisdiction by both competing authori-
ties. With the horizontal state-to-state relations, both conditions relate to ge-
ography; they are symmetric. A dispute must satisfy the same criteria for each 
state. With the vertical federal/state relations, the authority of the federal gov-
ernment depends on subject matter; the issue must fall within the federal gov-
ernment’s enumerated powers. The authority of the state extends to all subject 
matter questions other than those reserved exclusively to the federal govern-
ment by the U.S. Constitution.88 
The states and federal government are not identical in the way that the 
state governments are and neither is the method of resolving overlapping ju-
risdiction the same as with state governments. The federal government is hi-
erarchically superior, when in the area of overlap. The reason, of course, is 
the Supremacy Clause. Within the enumerated powers, Congress can assert 
federal power or not as it chooses. If it does not exercise power this is be-
cause it does not want to. If it does not want to, then the state is free to act. In 
the vertical system, the absence of a federal substantive law means Congress 
is content to remain with the decisions reached by the states. This is some-
thing of a compromise, giving authority to both the states and to the federal 
government. But it is hardly a compromise from positions of equality. It guar-
antees the federal government what it wants and leaves the rest to the states. 
This logic does not apply in the state/state system. Failure to legislate 
means nothing or is ambiguous. There would be no reason for states to take a 
position when their position would be irrelevant anyway. But Congress can 
directly say to the states that certain solutions are outside the bounds of the 
                                                                                                                           
 88 U.S. Constitution Article 1, Section 10 reads: 
 No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold 
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post 
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of No-
bility. 
 No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on 
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s in-
spection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on 
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all 
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 
 No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep 
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact 
with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually in-
vaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
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acceptable, because within the area of overlap it is superior. Congressional 
silence therefore means something. 
Vertical and horizontal federalism are different in the percentage of 
overlap cases that are resolvable through preemption. Almost all federal/state 
conflicts can be resolved through preemption because in the case of conflict, 
the federal priority (as stated by Congress, typically) governs. Congress can 
express preemption either by stating directly that the states are preempted 
from issuing laws on the subject or that they are not preempted; or by stating 
a substantive rule, with the indirect preempted effect that all state laws that 
are inconsistent are automatically invalid without an express statement to that 
effect. 
But that is true of only a small number of state/state disputes. For most 
of these, the eventual application of one law or the other is determined by 
where the dispute is resolved, that is by forum shopping. It is no longer as-
sumed that the results to be had in one state will be the same as the result to 
be had in all the other states. As a result of the so-called choice of law revolu-
tion, a long tradition of search for uniform and predictable answers, defined 
by unique geographical occurrences, has largely been abandoned. 
B. Putting the Model Together 
1. Principles of Preemption Summarized 
The following premises summarize the similarities and differences be-
tween state/state and federal/state preemption: 
a. Definition of Preemption: 
Preemption is relevant in situations where more than one authority has a 
prima facie case of jurisdiction. Preemption allocates authority within the area 
of overlap; it is governed by principles that are recognized on both sides, so 
that the two authorities should be able to agree on the result. Something is not 
a theory of preemption unless it reliably specifies a single law that applies to 
a particular case, occurrence, or legal issue. 
Preemption might be called “quasi-jurisdictional”; it takes place where 
jurisdiction exists in more than one authority, but for mutually agreed on rea-
sons, only one authority is entitled to exercise it. 
b. Definitions of Relevant Authoritative Entities: 
States are geographically defined, with borders that allocate particular 
pieces of territory to one state and one state alone. The federal government is 
defined by subject matter jurisdiction, as specified in the powers enumerated 
in the U.S. Constitution. 
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c. Relationships: 
The states are equal to one another and identical in authority and limita-
tions. The federal government, acting within its enumerated powers, is supe-
rior to the states and is unique. 
d. Areas of Overlap: 
Where an issue falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and 
state authorities, the values and priorities of the federal government prevail. 
This is a compromise of sorts, but not an equal one. Where an issue falls 
within the concurrent jurisdiction of more than one state authority the alloca-
tion of authority should be accomplished either through compromise and/or 
negotiation or reasonably inference about priorities shared by all states, and if 
it cannot be resolved this way then neither state preempts the other. 
e. Occurrence of Preemption: 
In federal/state relations, preemption of state law by federal law occurs 
whenever Congress specifies; Congress may also specify (if it chooses) that it 
does not wish to preempt state law. Where Congress has expressed no view 
on the preemption issue, it may matter that the state law in question was not 
in existence when the statute was passed, or that the issue was not politically 
salient. These may be relevant in interpreting Congressional silence on the 
issue, because if Congress is silent in the face of a preexisting state statute 
subject to intense controversy, this may suggest that Congress did not have an 
intent to preempt. Preemption is a less significant feature of horizontal feder-
alism because it occurs infrequently. Areas of overlap are substantial because 
it is infrequent for state jurisdiction to be defined in such a way as for only a 
single state to have authority over a particular case, occurrence, or legal issue. 
But they are rarely solved by state consensus. More typically, the rule that is 
applied depends on which authority is able to take control of resolving the 
dispute, for example, because of forum shopping by one of the parties. The 
silence of one or both parties on the preemption issue is irrelevant in deter-
mining whether preemption should occur, because neither state has authority 
to determine the question. The two states are equal and it is not for one or the 
other to decide. 
These principles shed some light on the application of preemption theo-
ry to the marijuana preemption controversy. 
2. The Special Problem of Marijuana Decriminalization 
The case is weak for federal/state preemption because there is sufficient 
basis for assuming Congressional tolerance for state inaction. At the time that 
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the federal statute was originally passed, Congress had no reason to think that 
states would automatically follow its example by criminalizing marijuana. It 
follows that Congress would have had no reason to object to states first crim-
inalizing and then decriminalizing the drug. The only difference between to-
day’s decriminalization legislation and the original failure to have any statute 
at all on the subject is that the former takes place against a backdrop of anti-
Washington animus while the latter was oblivious to any states’ rights politi-
cal movement. This consideration is simply an indication of motive, which 
should not be factored into the equation. All in all, it seems that interpretive 
considerations all point towards federal intent to tolerate different state laws. 
The possibility of horizontal preemption seems at least equally unlikely. 
The issue would arise if the effect in some states (such as Alpha) of decrimi-
nalization policies in the other states’ (such as Beta) made it impossible to 
enforce the preexisting drug laws. Perhaps the general availability of the drug 
in the decriminalizing state (Beta) encouraged people from the non-
liberalizing state (Alpha) to drive across the state line to where it was legal, 
procure it, bring it back home, and bring cause whatever deleterious conse-
quences that the Alpha government and citizens were fearing. Addiction, bro-
ken homes, and wasted lives would follow. “Why should other states be able 
to circumvent our protections for the health and welfare of our people?” ex-
claims the governor of Alpha. “Horizontal federalism requires that the people 
of Beta respect the way of life of the law abiding, God fearing, Alphans!” 
Alpha can argue that it has a good jurisdictional basis for asserting its 
authority over vendors and producers living in Beta, near the border. Its basis 
would be “impact territoriality”; the occurrence in Beta of activity with im-
pact inside Alpha. Impact territoriality is in fact a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion over someone acting in Beta, at least when the consequences in Alpha are 
reasonably foreseeable.89 And it is possible that Alpha’s fact finders might be 
able to satisfy that standard for vendors of this highly mobile product. 
But the question is not whether jurisdiction is available in Alpha, which 
it is. It is also available in Beta; the dispute is within the area of concurrent 
Alpha and Beta jurisdiction. The question that Alpha’s governor raises is 
whether Alpha’s law preempts Beta’s. Does Beta have an obligation to assist 
Alpha in enforcing its criminal prohibition, subordinating its own law in the 
process? Probably not, unless (paradoxically) Alpha also has the obligation to 
                                                                                                                           
 89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see 
also World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“The foreseeability that is 
critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the 
forum state. Rather it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such 
that he should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court there.” (citing Kulko v. Cal. Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97–98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). 
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assist Beta at the expense of its own policies; in other words, Beta’s law also 
preempts Alpha’s. This certainly cannot be the case. 
The circularity results from the lack of respect for a general ordering 
principle of logic, whereby a statement can only refer to another statement of 
a different, lower, logical order. If A refers to B and B can refer back to A, an 
endless loop arises. The problem is reminiscent of one version of the famous 
“liar paradox,” and also of the conflict of laws issue known as “renvoi.”90 
Liar Paradox: Assume that everyone in the world is either a truth teller 
who always tells the truth, or a liar who always lies. Jerry says to Donna, 
“You are a liar; everything you say is a lie.” Donna responds, “You are a truth 
teller; what you say is always true.” Who is lying, and who is telling the 
truth?91 
Renvoi: Suppose a tort case turns on the availability of the contributory 
negligence defense. Assume that it is being litigated in Alpha, whose choice 
of law rules refer to the law of Beta (the place where the injury occurred) as 
dispositive. But Beta choice of law rules in turn require reference back to the 
law of Alpha because, for example, it treats the issue as procedural law to be 
governed by the law of the forum. 
 The problem does not arise with vertical preemption because federal law 
refers to state law as a lower logical order; state law does not refer back to 
federal law, which is of a higher, more authoritative, logical order. 
In any event, the governor of Alpha has it wrong. She wants there to be 
two bases for jurisdiction over which Alpha would have preemptive authori-
ty: territoriality and impact territoriality. If Alpha has such authority to 
preempt then so must Beta, for any two states have equal and identical pow-
ers. But only one state can have the right to preempt other states on a particu-
lar set of facts. If Alpha preempts Beta regarding things actually happening 
inside Alpha, then Beta must preempt Alpha on things happening in Beta. 
Beta cannot be preempted by Alpha on things happening inside Beta. 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Jc Beall et al., Liar Paradox, § 1.3 Liar cycles, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (2016); Liar Paradox, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Renvoi, id. 
 91 See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 90. 
Consider a very concise (viz., one-sentence-each) dialog between siblings Max and 
Agnes. 
 Max: Agnes’ claim is true. 
 Agnes: Max’s claim is not true. 
What Max said is true if and only if what Agnes said is true. But what Agnes said 
(viz., ‘Max’s clam is not true’) is true if and only if what Max said is not true. 
Hence, what Max said is true if and only if what Max said is not true. But, now, if 
what Max said is true or not true, then it is both true and not true. 
Id. 
2017] Federal Preemption and State Decriminalization of Marijuana 927 
The first priority is obviously things occurring within the state’s border. 
No state would want to turn over regulation of such occurrences to other 
states, allowing them to preempt its authority. In fact, impact territoriality is 
derivative of the regulation of conduct occurring within the borders of the 
state. If the state is not concerned first and foremost with what is done in its 
territory, then there is no reason that it should be concerned with the conse-
quences within its territory of what has been done elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
This has, with any luck, been of enough interest to refocus the debate 
over marijuana decriminalization—to “re-stir the pot” (if that is not too frivo-
lous a note to end on). Hopefully, also, it is enough to reframe the debate on 
the basic logical principles underlying the comparison between vertical and 
horizontal preemption. Marijuana may be effective or ineffective for easing 
symptoms of serious diseases. It may be harmlessly enjoyable or it may be 
the kiss of death to the individuals who smoke it. But it certainly ought to be 
both effective and enjoyable as a source of legal disagreement, for the next 
few years at least. 
  
 
